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2I. INTRODUCTION 
The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”) creates a substantial 
liability for corporations and a potential windfall for civil RICO plaintiffs.1 Violations carry 
treble damages plus attorney’s fees and costs.2 For that reason, “[c]ivil RICO is an unusually 
potent weapon–the litigation equivalent of a thermonuclear device.”3 Because of this threat, civil 
RICO actions frequently settle if the suit moves beyond dispositive motions. Indeed, the “very 
pendency of a RICO suit can be stigmatizing and its consummation can be costly.”4 Therefore 
courts “strive to flush out frivolous RICO allegations” at an early stage of the litigation.5
Courts look with particularity to assure plaintiffs have sufficient RICO standing, as there 
is severe hardship to defendants should improper civil RICO suit continue beyond the early 
stages of litigation.6 Civil RICO has arguably been over-utilized because of its lucrative 
remedy,7 relatively low initial costs,8 and many statutory ambiguities.9 These qualities 
transformed the statute into an attractive option for private parties injured as a result of another’s 
illicit practices.10 Since its beginning, civil RICO’s vague boundaries permit its use in 
unconventional ways, which has recently led to a unilateral attempt by the United States 
Supreme Court to restrict its far reaching potential.11 This is so even where Congress may have 
intended to expand the racketeering statute to promote private enforcement of unlawful schemes, 
thus filling gaps of law enforcement capabilities.12 
1 See 18 U.S.C.S. §§ 1961 et seq. 
2 See id.; see also Micah King, RICO: A New Tool for Immigration Law Enforcement, CTR. FOR IMMIGRATION 
STUD. (Aug. 2003), available at http://www.cis.org/articles/2003/back1103.pdf (citing 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961 et seq.)
(“Additionally, the court can order the defendant to divest itself of any interest in any enterprise and to refrain from 
engaging in any commercial activity or making commercial investment.”).  
3 Miranda v. Ponce Fed. Bank, 948 F. 2d 44 (1st Cir. 1991).  
4 Id. 
5 Katzman v. Victoria’s Secret Catalogue, 167 F.R.D. 649, 655 (quoting Figueroa Ruiz v. Alegria, 896 F. 2d 645, 
650 (1st Cir. 1990)). 
6 See id. at 655. 
7 See King, supra note 2. 
8 See Jonathan Turley, The RICO Lottery and the Gains Multiplication Approach: An Alternative Measurement of 
Damages Under Civil RICO, 33 VILLANOVA L. REV. 239, 254 (1988) (stating that civil RICO litigation costs are 
small compared to its lucrative remedy that is set “at a sum great enough to ruin, or at least cripple, a racketeering 
business”). 
9 See generally Michael Goldsmith, Resurrecting RICO: Removing Immunity for White-Collar Crime, 41 HARV. J. 
ON LEGIS. 281, 289 (2004). 
10 See Patrick D. Hughes, The Investment Injury Requirement in Civil RICO Section 1962(a) Actions, 41 DEPAUL L. 
REV. 475, 483-85 (1992) (stating that RICO was ‘designed to deal with organized crime, but it also was crafted more 
broadly to deal with all forms of enterprise criminality’) (quoting Robert Blakey & Thomas A. Perry, An Analysis of 
the Myths that Bolster Efforts to Rewrite RICO and the Various Proposals for Reform: Mother of God, Is This the 
End of RICO?, 43 VAND. L. REV. 851, 860 (1990)). 
11 See id. 
12 See Raymond J. Dowd, Civil RICO Misread: The Judicial Repeal of the 1988 Amendments to the Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act, 14 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 946, 978-79 (1990/1991) (“Congress created civil RICO and its treble 
damages award as a supplement to enlist private resources in its domestic war on organized crime, a war that 
Congress believed public prosecutorial resources were insufficient to handle.”). 
3It is only those who abuse civil RICO’s broad application that should be limited, 
however, from RICO’s expansive reach.  Arguably, civil RICO was an effective tool to fight 
organized crime in the United States as well as those who profit and benefit from illicit activities.  
Although a civil RICO plaintiff may constitute a “broad” class of individual or corporation, the 
expansive requirements of assuring the defendant properly fall under the statute’s scope provides 
protection from unnecessary civil RICO claims.   
 
Civil RICO has provided a remedy to those directly affected by individuals or 
corporations that commit such crimes as systematic fraudulent schemes or violate provisions of 
the INA by hiring undocumented workers to gain an unlawful advantage.  At the very least, 
Congress utilizes civil RICO as an useful tool in fighting crime by continually amending civil 
RICO’s ‘predicate offenses’ that reach beyond the resources of law enforcement agencies.  
Therefore, when the Supreme Court applies a judicially created limitation to the standing 
requirements of civil RICO, as it has done in 2006, the Court has likely done so against the 
congressional intent of the statute.  The Supreme Court should take a ‘plain language’ 
interpretation of the statute to permit holding those responsible. 
 
In light of these competing theories of the statute, this comment analyzes a heavily 
litigated issue since civil RICO’s enactment–its unclear statutory scope and private party 
standing.13 To illustrate this issue, this comment explores recent RICO litigation related to the 
unlawful hiring of undocumented workers as an example of a congressionally supported 
application of civil RICO, but in a manner wholly unrelated to organized crime or the mafia.14 
While the Supreme Court has limited civil RICO’s outer boundaries, Congress seems to go the 
opposite direction by continually expanding the statute’s application.   
 
Part II.A and Part II.B outline RICO’s history and early development, illustrating a 
remarkable transformation from its initial purpose to modern application.  Part III.A and Part 
III.B then analyze the success of civil RICO in recent cases that address allegations unrelated to 
organized crime.  Specifically, Part III.B examines allegations against corporations that 
knowingly and systematically hire undocumented immigrants to gain economic advantages over 
their competitors, depress wages of their lawfully employed workforce, and “harbor” their 
undocumented employees from law enforcement agencies.   
 
Section Part III.C provides a detailed analysis of two recent Supreme Court civil RICO 
decisions that have seemingly attempted to restrict this broad RICO application.  In Anza v. Ideal 
Steel Supply (“Anza”),15 the Court showed implicit concern with civil RICO’s far-reaching 
potential and adverse economic impact.  Consequently, the Supreme Court expanded an already 
 
13 See John L. Koenig, What Have They Done to Civil RICO: The Supreme Court Takes the Racketeering 
Requirement Out of Racketeering, 35 AM. U. L. REV. 821, 857 (1986) (stating that district courts “had imposed a 
number of different standing limitations on private civil RICO actions”); Stephen Scallan, Proximate Cause Under 
RICO, 20 S. ILL. U. L.J. 455, 495 (1996) (noting the different interpretations courts have applied for civil RICO 
standing); Patrick Wackerly, Personal Versus Property Harm and Civil RICO Standing, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 1513, 
1527 (2006) (noting the difficulties in applying a uniform civil RICO standing test). 
14 See generally Commercial Cleaning Servs. v. Colin Serv. Systems, Inc., 271 F. 3d 374 (2001); Mendoza v. Zirkle 
Fruit Co., 301 F. 3d 1163 (9th Cir. 2002); Trollinger v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 370 F. 3d 602 (6th Cir. 2004); Zavala v. 
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 393 F. Supp. 2d 295 (D.N.J. 2005). 
15 Anza v. Ideal Steel Supply Corp., 126 S. Ct. 1991 (June 5, 2006). 
4narrow “direct proximate cause” requirement first set forth in Holmes v. Securities Investor 
Protection Corp. (“Holmes”) to further limit access to the statute.16 
Anza thus further restricts civil RICO standing even where Congress has, for decades, 
expanded the statute.  For example, in the late 1980s and early 1990s, RICO was unpopularity 
used “in various types of labor-management disputes, including strike and union litigation.”17 In 
1996, Congress expanded RICO’s predicate offenses to include violations of section 274 of the 
INA.18 These 1996 amendments brought immigration law violations, together with labor and 
employment law, into the statutory scope of civil RICO lawsuits.19 Thus, even legitimate 
corporations that have no connection to organized crime but nonetheless knowingly employed 
undocumented workers or even encourage illegal immigration, are liable to other employees, 
competitors, or undocumented workers for their participation in their unlawful hiring schemes.20 
Therefore, as discussed in detail infra, the Supreme Court’s recent civil RICO decisions 
restrict its statutory scope to only the ‘most’ directly affected by the unlawful practices (e.g., law 
enforcement agencies).  If this is correct, it goes directly against congressional intent of civil 
RICO.  Because RICO carries a broad statutory mandate that favors an expansive scope,21 
private enforcement of civil RICO due to violations of immigration law presents “an innovative 
method for tightening borders, [although] its economic impact on [corporations] in the United 
States may be harmful.”22 Congressional expansion of RICO, in adding INA violations as 
predicate offenses, illustrates that “[t]he use of RICO as an immigration enforcement tool is 
consistent with Congress’ intent to provide a remedy to businesses suffering harm from illegal 
competition.”23 Therefore, “there is little doubt that such suits can provide adequate remedies for 
businesses and employees” who are injured by the illicit practices of their competitors.24 
II. THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE RACKETEERING INFLUENCED  AND  CORRUPT 
ORGANIZATIONS ACT  (RICO) 
 
A. Civil RICO’s Enactment 
 
RICO was enacted by Congress as part of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970 “in 
response to public outcry and several government studies revealing pervasive infiltration of the 
legitimate business community by the mafia and other organized crime syndicates.”25 The 
enactment of RICO was to empower federal prosecutors the powers to enforce criminal penalties 
 
16 Holmes v. Securities Investor Protection Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 268 (1992). 
17 Elisabeth J. Sweeney Yu, Addressing the Economic Impact of Undocumented Immigration on the American 
Worker: Private RICO Litigation and Public Policy, 20 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 909, 936 (2006). 
18 This was codified in 8 U.S.C. § 1324; see discussion infra Part II.B. 
19 See 8 U.S.C. § 1324. 
20 See King, supra note 2 (citing 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961 - 1968). 
21 United States v. Pepe, 747 F.2d 632, 659 (11th Cir. 1984). 
22 Adam J. Homicz, Private Enforcement of Immigration Law: Expanded Definitions Under RICO and the 
Immigration and Nationality Act, 38 Suffolk U.L. Rev. 621, 623 (2005). 
23 Id. at 637 (citing Teresa Bryan et al., Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REV.
987, 989 (2003)). 
24 Homicz, supra note 22, at 638 (citing Micah King, supra note 2). 
25 Daniel Z. Herbst, Injunctive Relief and Civil RICO: After Scheidler v. National Org. for Women, Inc., RICO’s 
Scope and Remedies Require Reevaluation, 53 CATH U.L. REV. 1125 (2004). 
5and civil equitable remedies against the mafia.26 By providing a civil RICO cause of action, 
private individuals and corporations are also able to recover damages directly caused from the 
“broad patterns of racketeering activities associated with organized crime.”27 
RICO has always been applied broadly.  Indeed, Congress charged that RICO should be 
“liberally construed to effectuate its remedial purposes.”28 RICO was part of an “aggressive 
initiative to supplement old remedies and develop new methods for fighting crime.”29 After an 
eightfold increase in civil RICO actions between 1983 and 1988,30 including more than one 
thousand actions filed per year,31 district courts increasingly presided over civil RICO cases in 
areas not typically associated with organized crime.  Although there are many harsh critics 
against the broad application of RICO because of its adverse potential economic impact, it is not 
clear whether a broad application of this remedial statute is bad.  Indeed, “RICOs ‘liberal 
construction’ clause . . . seeks to ensure that Congress’ intent is not frustrated by an overly 
narrow reading of the statute.”32 
Even though RICO was endorsed because of “the perceived need to combat organized 
crime . . . , [Congress] chose to enact a more general statute, one which . . . was not limited in 
application to organized crime.33 Further, the Supreme Court has stated that although “RICO 
may be a poorly drafted statute[,] rewriting it is a job for Congress . . . and not for this Court. 
There is no more room in RICO's ‘self-consciously expansive language and overall approach’ for 
the imposition of an organized crime limitation . . . .”34 
Drafting a Constitutionally sound statute geared towards a group such the mafia proved 
to be challenging.35 As a result, Congress “defined ‘racketeering activity’ by incorporating into 
its definition numerous predicate offenses chargeable under state and federal law that had long 
been associated with organized crime syndicates.”36 The original Senate RICO bill did not 
include a civil action and remedy for private persons.37 Civil RICO was actually “eleventh-hour 
 
26 Id. at 1126. 
27 Id. 
28 Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. IMREX Co., Inc., 473 U.S. 479, 528 (1985) (quoting Pub. L. 92-452, § 904(a), 84 Stat. 947) 
(Powell, J. dissenting). 
29 Id. at 498. 
30 Id. at 481 n.1. 
31 William H. Rehnquist, Remarks of the Chief Justice, 21 ST. MARY’S L.J. 5, 9 (1989). 
32 Reves v. Ernst & Young, 507 U.S. 170, 183 (1993). 
33 H.J., Inc. v. NW Bell Telephone Co., 109 S. Ct. 2893, 2905 (1989). 
34 Id. at 2905 (citations omitted). 
35 See Cecil Greek, Is This the End of RICO? Or Only the Beginning?, 19 FREE INQUIRY IN CREATIVE SOCIOLOGY 1
(May 1991). 
36 Herbst, supra note 25, at 1130-31 (citing John L. Koenig, What Have They Done to Civil RICO: The Supreme 
Court Takes the Racketeering Requirement Out of Racketeering, 35 AM. U. L. REV. 821, 829 n.34 (1986) 
(explaining that in defining racketeering activity, Congress created a  “functional legal concept” rather than 
attempting to define organized crime or attach a specific connection to it). 
37 During hearings before the House Judiciary Committee, Representative Steiger proposed the addition of a private 
treble-damages action and stated “[those] who have been wronged by organized crime should at least be given 
access to a legal remedy.”  The Committee approved the amendment.  See S. No. 30, before Subcommittee No. 5, 
91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970). 
6addition”38 to encourage private parties in assisting with “the eradication of organized crime in 
the United States.”39 “While RICO is designed to combat the infiltration into and corruption of 
America’s legitimate business community by organized crime, it is only occasionally put to these 
ends in civil cases today.”40 The remedy of treble damages as well as attorneys’ fees and costs 
has drawn numerous plaintiffs who would have otherwise file state tort claims into federal 
courts.41 
Federal courts have struggled with the broad congressional mandate to broadly construe 
RICO.  It is arguably this liberal construction clause that allowed RICO’s application to first 
expand beyond its initial intended scope.42 Although the Supreme Court has historically been 
“overtly cautious so as not to overstep the boundaries of judicial review,”43 its recent decision in 
Anza is a transparent attempt to restrict civil RICO’s private use beyond those harmed by 
organized criminal activity.  This is true even though it has been utilized such a manner for more 
than two decades. 
 
RICO defines racketeering activity as (1) any act “‘chargeable’ under several generically 
described state criminal laws; (2) any act ‘indictable’ under numerous specific federal criminal 
law provisions, including mail and wire fraud; (3) and any ‘offense’ involving narcotics or 
bankruptcy or securities fraud ‘punishable’ under federal law.”44 The use of income derived 
from a ‘pattern of racketeering activity’ in relation to an ‘enterprise’ engaged in or affecting 
interstate commerce is explicitly prohibited by civil RICO.45 At least two actions of racketeering 
activity constitute the requisite pattern of racketeering.46 
To determine whether a plaintiff has statutory standing to bring a RICO claim, the 
plaintiff must satisfy three pleading requirements: “(1) a violation of [a prohibited activity as 
provided in] section 1962;47 (2) injury to business or property; and (3) causation of the injury by 
the violation.”48 With regard to the aforementioned causation requirement, a RICO plaintiff 
lacks standing absent a direct relationship between the injury alleged and the predicate RICO 
offense.49 A critical limitation on this causation requirement, first purported in the Supreme 
 
38 GREGORY P. JOSEPH, CIVIL RICO A DEFINITIVE GUIDE, ch. 1, § 2 (2000) (citing Kurzweil, Criminal & Civil 
RICO: Traditional Canons of Statutory Interpretation and the Liberal Construction Clause, 30 COLUM. J.L. & SOC.
PROBS. 41, 60 (1996)). 
39 Statement of Findings and Purpose, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922 (1970), as reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N 
1073. 
40 JOSEPH, supra note 38 (citing Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. at 943 (1970)). 
41 Rehnquist, supra note 31, at 9; see also Herbst, supra note 25, at 1134. 
42 Herbst, supra note 25, at 1134. 
43 Id. 
44 Religious Tech. Ctr. & Church of Scientology Int’l, Inc. v. Wollersheim, 796 F.2d 1076, 1080 (9th Cir. 1986) 
(citing 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1962). 
45 Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1965(5)). 
46 Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1964). 
47 “A violation of § 1962(c) requires (1) conduct (2) of an enterprise (3) through a pattern (4) of racketeering activity 
[and while] [t]he plaintiff must, of course, allege each of these elements to state a claim . . . the statute requires no 
more than this.”  See Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 496-97 (1985). 
48 First Nationwide Bank v. Gelt Funding Corp. 27 F. 3d 763, 767 (2d Cir. 1994). 
49 Id. at 769. 
7Court decision of Holmes,50 is that a defendant’s RICO violation “was the “but-for” [cause] of 
the [the plaintiff’s] injury,”51 in addition to the legal or proximate cause.52 
B.  Developments in Civil RICO Application  
 
The purpose of civil RICO was “not merely to compensate victims, but to turn them into 
prosecutors, or ‘private attorneys general,’ dedicated to eliminating racketeering activity.”53 The 
unintended consequence of Congress’ broad construction clause provided “plaintiffs with an 
avenue to bring actions in the federal courts against defendants who were not associated with 
[the mafia or] organized crime.”   
 
In United States v. Turkette, the Supreme Court found that RICO applies to legitimate 
enterprises, including individuals or corporations.54 At issue in Turkette was the definition of the 
term ‘enterprise’ as applied under RICO.55 Some lower courts had, up at this point, limited civil 
RICO to criminal, illegitimate (or racketeering) enterprises.56 Now, “[g]iven the ruling in 
Turkette, RICO could be used not only against the mafia and other criminal organizations, but 
[also] . . . be used against corporations, political protest groups, [and] labor unions.”57 This early 
interpretation by the Supreme Court was arguably the first time application of civil RICO went 
beyond its initial legislative purpose.58 
Because “the term ‘enterprise’ includes legitimate and illegitimate organizations [or 
corporations], and given that a RICO claim can be based on violations of the [overbroad] mail or 
wire fraud statutes . . . [and now violations of the INA],” RICO can be used in an unlimited 
number of factual scenarios.59 Although a violation cannot exist in the absence of long-term 
criminal activity, RICO’s favorable remedies and ambiguity have directed many legitimate state 
claims into federal court.60 
If a statute has drafting errors, which make it impermissively ambiguous, or courts have 
stepped beyond their judicial bounds, Congress is clearly the proper branch to limit or clarify the 
statute.61 In this case, however, Congress has not enacted any substantial restrictive amendments 
 
50 Holmes v. Securities Investor Protection Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 268 (1992). 
51 Gelt Funding Corp. 27 F. 3d at 769. 
52 See id. Proximate cause is “an event sufficiently related to a legally recognizable injury to be held the cause of 
that injury.  See Proximate Cause, WIKIPEDIA (2007). Many courts, however, improperly define proximate cause as 
the “but-for” test (i.e., but-for the rain, the car would not have crashed).  Proximate cause is actually a limitation on 
the “but-for” causation test because it requires that the action be “close enough to a harm in a chain of events to be a 
legally culpable cause of the harm.”  Id. 
53 Rotella v. Wood, 528 U.S. 549 (2000); see also Attorney General of Can. v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Holdings, 
Inc., 268 F.3d 103 (2d Cir. 2001). 
54 United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 585 (1981) (“The aim [of civil RICO] is to divest the association of the 
fruits of its ill-gotten gains.”). 
55 See id. 
56 See id. 
57 See Ricoact.com, http://www.ricoact.com/ricoact/faq.asp (last visited Jan. 26, 2007) (RICO claims can be based 
upon the activities of any group or organization whose members pursue a common goal). 
58 Frequently Asked Questions RicoAct.com, http://www.ricoact.com/ricoact/faq.asp (last visited Jan. 26, 2007). 
59 Id. 
60 See RicoAct.com, http://www.ricoact.com/ricoact/index.asp (last visited Jan. 26, 2007). 
61 See generally Amanda Frost, Certifying Questions to Congress, BERKELEY ELECTRONIC PRESS (2006)  
8to change the statute.  Only once, as part of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 
has Congress enacted a RICO amendment that could be viewed as limiting.62 The securities 
litigation reform movement amended RICO to require that a defendant be criminally convicted 
of securities fraud before the defendant was subject to a civil RICO claim, thus virtually 
removing securities fraud as a predicate offense.63 
At the time, Congress chose to limit civil RICO claims against securities fraud defendants 
“because securities laws generally provide adequate remedies for those injured by securities 
fraud, [and Congress believed] it [was] both unnecessary and unfair to expose defendants in 
securities cases to the threat of treble damages and other extraordinary remedies provided by 
RICO.”64 However, following the securities fraud purported through Enron’s practices, the 1995 
securities fraud amendment to RICO has been widely criticized by some legal commentators 
who have recommended that Congress repeal this restriction.65 
In 1996, Congress further expanded RICO’s predicate offenses even though it was 
unquestionably aware of federal courts’ twenty-year struggle in interpreting the statute.  This 
expansion of civil RICO promoted private assistance to the limited resources of U.S. 
immigration law enforcement agencies that faced millions of undocumented residents working 
illegally in the United States.66 Indeed, Congress signed three major pieces of legislation into 
law in 1996 that affected all immigrants, including a sweeping reform to U.S. immigration 
enforcement policies.67 
RICO, as amended in 1996, added a violation of Section 274 of the INA68 to the list of 
prohibited conduct qualifying as a predicate offense under 18 U.S.C. § 1961.69 This expanded 
racketeering activity for purposes of RICO to include “any act which is indictable under the 
[INA], section 274 (relating to bringing in and harboring certain aliens).”70 “In contrast, section 
274A is entitled ‘Unlawful Employment of Aliens’ and qualifies several prohibitions on 
 
62 See Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (1995).  This Securities 
Litigation Reform Act was designed to curtail class action lawsuits by the plaintiffs bar. See Adam C. Pritchard, 
Should Congress Repeal Securities Class Action Reform?, SOC. SCI. RESEARCH NETWORK (Mar. 2003), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=389561. 
63 See Statement of the Honorable Orrin Hatch, U.S. Senator, S. Hearing, Feb. 6, 2002. 
64 Id. (quoting former Securities and Exchange Commission Chairman Arthur Levitt). 
65 See e.g., Goldsmith, supra note 9, at 305 (“[T]he Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 stands as the 
most formidable obstacle to Enron victims and others similarly situated. . . . Congress should repeal RICO’s 
securities exemption. Further, this repeal should operate retroactively so that injured investors could sue for relief. 
Retroactive application would be fully constitutional.”) (citation omitted). 
66 Micah King, supra note 2 (citing 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961 - 1968). 
67 Immigration and Welfare Changes, 3 RURAL MIGRATION NEWS 4 (Oct. 1996), available at 
http://migration.ucdavis.edu/rmn/more.php?id=155_0_4_0. 
68 As codified in 8 U.S.C. 1324. 
69 Homicz, supra note 22, at 623. 
70 Id. at 629.  The addition of INA violations to RICO was came within the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death 
Penalty Act of 1996. S. Rep. No. 104-179 (1995), as reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 924.  These amendments were 
part of much broader legislation aimed at combating the economic and personal costs of rising crime in the United 
States.  See also id. at 629 (citing S. Rep. No. 104-179, at 17 (1995), as reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 924, 930). 
9employment of illegal aliens in the United States.”71 The new INA predicate offenses made it 
unlawful to encourage illegal immigration or employ illegal immigrants.72 Although private 
enforcement of the INA is prohibited, adding this predicate offense to RICO provided an outlet 
for private immigration enforcement, albeit through indirect means.  At the very least, it would 
impact corporations that lowered their costs by systematically employing undocumented 
immigrants. 
 
It is entirely possible that Congress viewed illegal immigration as large a national issue as 
organized crime in the late 1960s and 1970s.  Illegal immigrants’ ease at finding employment in 
the United States was (and still is) a large reason behind the surge of illegal immigration into the 
United States.73 In 2006, it was estimated that there are more than twelve million undocumented 
workers in the United States.74 Congress, by adding INA offenses to RICO, addressed a large, 
national issue that necessitated resources far beyond those available to state and federal law 
enforcement agencies.  If the United States government is able to limit the employment of 
undocumented workers, it is likely that the flow of illegal immigrants into this country would 
subside.   
 
Congress did not believe the mafia was involved in the employment of undocumented 
workers, yet it decided to once again expand civil RICO.  This illustrates that Congress views the 
remedial statute as an effective measure to eliminate large national problems that are beyond the 
bounds of governmental law enforcement agencies.  Nevertheless, Congress, aware of courts and 
attorneys’ struggle over the last twenty years in interpreting (and restricting) civil RICO, it also 
showed its approval a continued expansion of RICO’s ability to curb widespread unlawful 
practices. 
 
III. THE MODERN APPLICATION OF CIVIL RICO 
 
Even by the early 1990s, it was clear that RICO’s application had spread far beyond its 
original congressional purpose.75 RICO was utilized primarily by private plaintiffs to target a 
“garden-variety fraud and ordinary commercial disputes.”76 There were clear problems with this 
type of RICO application, including how to interpret what many legal scholars argue is a poorly 
 
71 See id. (quoting 8 U.S.C.§ 1324(a) (codifying section 274(a)).  “8 U.S.C.§ 1324a(a) provides that it is unlawful for 
a person or other entity to ‘hire, or to recruit or reer for a fee, for employment in the United States an alien knowing 
the alien is an unauthorized alien . . . with respect to such employment.”  Id. (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(a)(1)(A)). 
72 See King, supra note 2. 
73 See Karin Rives, Illegal Immigration – Who Profits, Who Pays: Jobs Lure Immigrants to State, THE NEWS &
OBSERVER (Feb. 26, 2006) (“Four hundred thousand strong . . . [immigrants are] drawn by the jobs that North 
Carolina employers eagerly offer . . . .”). 
74 Stephen Ohlemacher, Number of Illegal Immigrants Hits 12M, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Mar. 7, 2006), available at 
http://www.breitbart.com/news/2006/03/07/D8G6U2KO8.html (“The number of illegal immigrants in the United 
States has grown to as many as 12 million, and they now account for about one in every 20 workers.”). 
75 See Clarkin, Catherine M., Reves v. Ernst & Young: The Elimination of Professional Liability Under RICO, 43 
Cath U.L. Rev. 1025, 1028 (1994). 
76 See id. (citing A.B.A., Sec. Corp. Banking & Businesss Law, Report of the Ad Hoc Civil RICO Task Force 57 
(1985) (reporting that out of the 270 civil RICO actions surveyed, 40% alleged securities fraud, 37% alleged 
common law fraud in a commercial setting, and only 9% alleged ‘criminal activity of a type generally associated 
with professional criminals”); see also Susan Getzendanner, Judicial “Pruning” of “Garden Variety Fraud” Civil 
RICO Cases Does Not Work: It’s Time for Congress to Act, 43 VAND. L. REV. 673, 678 (1990). 
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drafted statute,77 a massive federal court docket increase,78 and most importantly, unpredictable 
and conflicting civil RICO requirements.79 Several judges, including former Chief Justice 
William H. Rehnquist, pleaded to Congress for an amendment to restrict civil RICO, although 
Congress denied that request.80 Congressional action over the past twenty years into account 
shows (at least implicitly) that Congress has acquiesced with RICO’s broad application in the 
judicial system. 
 
RICO is one of the most sophisticated and complicated federal statutes,81 and the 
Supreme Court at least initially resisted any temptation to place specific limits on its statutory 
scope.82 Over time, however, the Supreme Court has provided restrictive guidelines in effort to 
provide lower courts guidance in uniformly interpreting RICO’s statutory provisions.  
Nevertheless, federal courts have continued to struggle with RICO’s standing requirements, 
which results in conflicting and often perplexing decisions.  While there are policy arguments in 
favor of a more restrictive interpretation, such as the adverse economic impact of widespread 
RICO application and the proverbial ‘floodgate’ argument,83 it is beyond judicial powers to 
create these boundaries.84 Yet, it seems that the Supreme Court has again attempted to restrict 
civil RICO in its 2006 term without any congressional support or amendments to the statute.85 
Section A of this section analyzes the Supreme Court’s opinion in Holmes, decided in its 
1992 term.86 In Holmes, the Supreme Court placed a relatively narrow standing restriction on 
civil RICO when it created a “direct proximate cause” limitation.87 This would clearly have an 
impact in reducing the number of available private plaintiffs that have standing to bring a RICO 
claim.   It is worth noting that Holmes was decided prior to RICO’s 1996 legislative amendments 
that further expanded RICO.  Section B begins by discussing the case of Commercial Cleaning 
Servs. v. Colin Service Systems, Inc. (“Commercial Cleaning”) decided in 2001, and further 
discussed new applications of civil RICO following the 1996 amendments.88 Section C 
discusses the impact the Supreme Court’s Anza decision, which expands the Holmes standing 
limitations.
77 See H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Telephone Co., 492 U.S. 229, 249 (1989) (asserting that “RICO [is] a poorly 
drafted statute.”). 
78 See Rehnquist, supra note 31. 
79 Laurence A. Steckman, RICO Section 1962(c) Enterprises and the Present Status of the “Distinctness 
Requirement in the Second, Third, and Seventh Circuits, 21 Touro L. Rev. 1083, 1093 (2006) (noting that different 
circuits have adopted different interpretations and tests in applying the RICO statute). 
80 See Rehnquist, supra note 31, at 9. 
81 See United States v. Anderson, 626 F.2d 1358 (8th Cir. 1980) (noting that the statutory language in RICO is 
particularly complicated, however, the Court believed it to be a “a carefully crafted piece of legislation”). 
82 See Clarkin, Catherine M., Reves v. Ernst & Young: The Elimination of Professional Liability Under RICO, 43 
CATH. U.L. REV. 1025, 1040 (1994). 
83 See Darby Dickerson, Curtailing Civil RICO’s Long Reach: Establishing New Boundaries for Venue and 
Personal Jurisdiction Under 18 U.S.C. § 1965, 75 NEB. L. REV. 476, 486-90 (1996) (stating that beginning in the 
1980s, “the proverbial floodgates appeared to open and private attorneys began filing nearly 1000 civil RICO 
actions a year”) (citing William J. Hughes, RICO Reform: How Much is Needed?, 43 Vand. L. Rev. 639, 644 
(1990)). 
84 See H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Telephone Co., 492 U.S. 229, 249 (1989). 
85 See Anza v. Ideal Steel Supply Corp., 126 S. Ct. 1991 (June 5, 2006)  
86 Holmes v. Securities Investor Protection Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 268 (1992). 
87 See id. 
88 See Commercial Cleaning Servs. v. Colin Serv. Systems, Inc., 271 F. 3d 374 (2001). 
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A. The Holmes “Direct Proximate Cause” Limitation to Civil RICO 
 
Holmes directly addressed an issue that plagued civil RICO since its inception, which 
was who has statutory standing to bring a claim against defendants that have violated one of 
RICO’s predicate offenses.89 The issue is one of statutory construction.  The pertinent facts of 
Holmes were as follows: (1) The Securities Investor Protection Corporation (“SIPA”), a private 
corporation,90 initiated suit against an investor, Robert G. Holmes (the “investor”), who 
conspired in a stock-manipulation scheme that “disabled two broker-dealers from meeting 
obligations to customers, thus triggering SIPC’s statutory duty to advance funds to reimburse the 
defrauded customers[;]”91 (2) SIPC sought to recover this money from the investor utilizing civil 
RICO, which would provide treble damages as well as attorney’s fees and costs;92 (3) the district 
court found that SIPC had not satisfied the proximate cause requirement under RICO.93 
The Ninth Circuit United States Court of Appeals reversed,94 and, as pertinent to the 
proximate cause deficiency, held that the district court’s decision finding  
 
no proximate cause to be error, [as it] . . . mistaken[ly] focus[ed] on the causal 
relation between SIPC’s injury and the acts of [the investor] alone.  [Because] he 
could be held responsible for the acts of all his co-conspirators, . . . the district 
court should have looked to the causal relation between SIPC’s injury and the acts 
of all conspirators.95 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari, certifying the question of whether the investor could be 
held responsible for the actions of his co-conspirators, which directed the Court to an 
examination of who has statutory standing under civil RICO to bring a claim under the statute.96 
Justice Souter wrote for the Court’s majority and found that a literal interpretation of civil 
RICO could be read to mean that under Section 1964, any plaintiff could recover by reason of 
civil RICO simply by showing that (1) the defendant violated a RICO predicate act(s) under 
section 1962; (2) the plaintiff was injured; (3) and the defendant’s violation was a “but for” cause 
 
89 Holmes, 503 U.S. at 268. 
9090 SIPC provides investor protection by “[r]estoring funds to investors with assetsin the hands of bankrupt and 
otherwise financially troubled brokerage firms.” See SIPC, http://www.sipc.org/who/whysipc.cfm (last visited Jan. 4 
2007).  “Though created by the Securities Investor Protection Act (15 U.S.C. §78aaa et seq., as amended), SIPC is 
neither a governmental agency nor a regulatory authority.  It is a nonprofit membership corporation, funded by its 
member securities broker-dealers.” Id. at http://www.sipc.org/who/statute.cfm  (last visited Jan. 4, 2006). 
91 Id. 
92 Id. 
93 Holmes, 908 F.2d 1461 (9th Cir. 1990) (entering summary judgment for Holmes on the RICO claim, and ruling 
that SIPC “does not meet the ‘purchaser-seller’ requirements for standing to assert RICO claims”) 
94 See Securities Investor Protection Corp. v. Vigman, 908 F. 2d 1461 (1990). 
95 Id. 
96 Holmes, 503 U.S. at 268. 
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of plaintiff’s injury.97 Justice Souter, however, explicitly rejected this construction under an 
“assumption” that Congress never meant to allow standing by all directly injured plaintiffs.98 
Justice Souter turned to a statutory interpretation analysis by looking at RICO’s 
development and history.  The Court found that section 1964’s borrowed its language from the 
federal anti-trust act, section 4 of the Clayton Act,99 which had in turn borrowed its structure 
from section 7 of the Sherman Act.100 Accordingly, Justice Souter held that a plaintiff’s right to 
sue under section 4 of the Clayton Act required a showing that the defendant’s violation not only 
was the ‘but-for’ cause of his injury, but the proximate cause as well (but-for causation limitation 
it be close enough to the harm looking at the chain of events).101 In recognizing the mirrored 
language between statutes, Justice Souter held that “we can only assume it intended them 
[section 4 of the Clayton Act and Section 1964(c) of civil RICO] to have the same meaning that 
courts had already given them.”102 Thus, direct proximate cause was required in establishing 
liability under civil RICO.103 
“A plaintiff who complained of harm flowing merely from the misfortunes visited upon a 
third person by the defendant’s acts [is] generally said to stand at too remote a distance to 
recover.”104 It is also true that the less direct an injury, the more difficult it becomes to ascertain 
the amount of a plaintiff’s damages attributable to the violation as distinct from other, 
independent, factors.105 Accordingly, Justice Souter asserted that claims of the indirectly injured 
would force courts to “adopt complicated rules apportioning damages among plaintiffs removed 
at different levels of injury from the violative acts, to obviate the risk of multiple recoveries.”106 
Consequently, the Supreme Court decided to outright rejected the argument that those not most 
directly injured can act as a deterrent because those most directly injured can generally be 
counted on to vindicate the law.107 
In applying this judicially created interpretation of what it labeled “direct proximate 
cause,” Justice Souter ultimately found SIPA too removed from the investor’s fraudulent 
scheme, as those directly injured were the broker-dealers who were victims of fraud (although 
these broker-dealers were repaid their lost money by SIPA).  Moreover, although SIPC argued 
that Congress placed a liberal construction clause to RICO, Justice Souter rejected that his 
 
97 See id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (“[a]ny person injured in his business or property by reason of a violation of 
section 1962 of this chapter may sue therefore in any appropriate United States district court and shall recover 
[damages] . . .”). 
98 See id. at 268 (internal citations omitted). 
99 Section 4 of the Clayton Act reads in pertinent part that “[a]ny person who shall be injured in his business or 
property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue . . .” 15 U.S.C. § 15. 
100 Section 7 of the Sherman Act read, in pertinent part when the Clayton Act was passed that “[a]ny person who 
shall be injured in his business or property by any other person or corporation by reason of anything forbidden or 
declared to be unlawful by this act, may sue . . . “ 26 Stat. 210. 
101 Holmes, 503 U.S. at 268 (citing Assoc. General Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 534 (1983); 
see also discussion supra at note 43. 
102 Id. (emphasis added). 
103 See id. 
104 Id. (citing 1 J. SUTHERLAND, LAW OF DAMAGES 55-56 (1882)). 
105 See id. (citing Assoc. General Contractors, 459 U.S. at 540). 
106 Id. 
107 See id. 
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analysis conflicted with that broad mandate.108 Rather, the Supreme Court found that if it 
permitted suits by those “indirectly” injured, it would “open the door to ‘massive and complex 
damages litigation, [which would] not only burden the courts, but [would] also undermine the 
effectiveness of treble-damages suits.’”109 
This rationale by Justice Souter illustrates the heart of RICO statutory standing 
confusion.  Although it reached its conclusion through a rationale that is unusual under the RICO 
statute (e.g., comparing it to other statutory counterparts and thereby further complicating its 
already intricate application),110 the crux of this whole debate is whether a plaintiff must be the 
“most directly injured” or merely “directly injured” by the actions of the defendant.   While the 
most directly injured application, as applied in Holmes and later in the Supreme Court’s Anza 
decision, may assist lower courts in creating bright line rules to limit RICO’s statutory scope, it 
also closes the door to many other potential (and proper) private plaintiffs, which also would 
restrict civil class actions that give “teeth” to civil RICO. 
 
Justice Scalia, in his Holmes concurrence, pointedly stated that “[o]ne of the usual 
elements of statutory standing is proximate causality.”111 Justice Scalia, however, rejected Justice 
Souter’s holding that proximate causality is required in RICO because of its similar language 
with the Clayton and Sherman Acts.  Instead, Justice Scalia held:  
 
[B]ecause it has always been the practice of common-law courts to require as a 
condition of recovery . . . . Life is too short to pursue every human act to its most 
remote consequences; ‘for want of a nail, a kingdom was lost’ is a commentary on 
fate, not the statement of a major cause of action against a blacksmith.112 
Justice Scalia assumed that proximate causality existed in RICO, and did not further the 
discussion of how and where that line should be drawn. 
 
While the Supreme Court clearly established a causation link (direct proximate cause) in 
civil RICO claims, it failed to explain exactly how plaintiffs should show this connection with 
regard to the many different types of predicate offenses under the statute.113 In fact, Holmes 
resulted in numerous standards of proximate cause imposed by lower courts, with some even 
requiring plaintiffs to “demonstrate that the defendant’s misreprentations were relied on.”114 
However, reliance has never been a requisite element under Holmes.115 In fact, there has been 
 
108 See id. 
109 Id. (quoting Assoc. General Contractors, 459 U.S. at 545). 
110 See Wackerly, supra note 13, at 1526 (stating that “despite Congress’s apparent purpose, Clayton Act 
jurisprudence is inapplicable to the present question of civil RICO standing”). 
111 Id. (Scalia, J. concurring). 
112 Id. (Scalia, J. concurring) (quoting Assoc. General Contractors, 459 U.S. at 519). 
113 See Randy D. Gordon, Rethinking Civil RICO: The Vexing Problem of Causation in Fraud, 39 UNIV. OF SAN 
FRAN. L. REV. 319, 332 (2005) 
114 Metromedia Co. v. Fugazy, 983 F.2d 350, 368 (2d Cir. 1992) (citing County of Suffolk v. Long Island Lighting 
Co., 907 F.2d 1295, 1311 (2d Cir. 1992)); see also Ryan C. Morris, Proximate Cause and Civil RICO Standing: The 
Narrowly Restrictive and Mechanical Approach in Lerner v. Fleet Bank and Baisch v. Gallina, 2004 B.Y.U. L. REV.
739, 764 (2004). 
115 Matthew M. Neumeier & Brian D. Hansen, Navigating the Remedial Scheme Under Civil RICO, THE NAT’L L. J. 
(2006).  
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criticism that this reliance standard goes far beyond the construct of the “tripartite analysis” in 
Holmes.116 In actuality, [n]o one has credibly argued that strict causation standards (often stated 
in terms of reliance) have proved an impediment to otherwise meritorious individual suits.”117 
Holmes’ direct proximate causation is clearly the “lynchpin of any civil RICO case”118 and a 
court’s unpredictable interpretation can make or break a civil RICO claim. 
 
B. Applying Civil RICO to Acts Unrelated to Organized Crime 
 
Even before RICO’s INA predicate offense amendments in 1996, private parties 
attempted to utilize civil RICO in various types of labor-management disputes.119 Although this 
practice was criticized in the early 1990s,120 Congress continued expanding RICO’s predicate 
acts to assist law enforcement by allowing private parties to enforce provisions of immigration 
statutes by the suit of private attorneys general.121 Consequently, three different groups of RICO 
plaintiffs have commenced actions as result of the addition of the INA provision of civil RICO.   
 
The first instance is where a plaintiff corporation brings suit against a competitor 
corporation that allegedly employed undocumented workers in violation of the INA to gain a 
competitive advantage.122 These plaintiff corporations often lose lucrative contracts and 
customers to competitors that can lower costs due to unlawfully employing undocumented 
immigrants.123 The second instance is where lawfully employed workers bring a class action 
civil RICO claim against an employer that allegedly hired illegal immigrants, which 
consequently depress wages and produce otherwise unnecessary layoffs.124 Third, and possibly 
the most innovative use civil RICO, is where undocumented workers themselves initiate a RICO 
suit against their employer to enforce existing labor laws that protect them from exploitation.125 
It is clear that these “schemes” were never a part of a more elaborate organized crime 
scheme of hiring undocumented workers.  The dilemma, at risk of oversimplification, is whether 
civil RICO is proper to assist directly injured private parties in enforcing laws against those 
profiting from unlawful practices.  Although Congress has certainly expanded RICO far beyond 
the sphere of organized crime, courts have generally been equally resistant to allow these types 
of suits to reach past dispositive motions.  That leaves the following question:  is it for the courts 
to decide the breadth and scope of civil RICO or Congress? 
 
116 See Morris, supra note 114, at 764 (quoting Michael Goldsmith & Evan S. Tilton, Proximate Cause in Civil 
Racketeering Cases: The Misplaced Role of Victim Reliance, 59 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 83, 110-11 (2002)). 
117 Gordon, supra note 113, at 332. 
118 Id. 
119 See Yellow Bus Lines, Inc. v. Drivers, Chauffeurs & Helpers, 286 U.S. App. D.C. 182 (D.C. Dist. Ct. App. 
1990). 
120 Raymond P. Green, The Application of RICO to Labor-Management and Employment Disputes, 7 St. THOMAS L. 
REV. 309 (1995) (stating that the ability of private parties to bring RICO suits in labor-management disputes is 
disruptive of the relationship). 
121 See Sweeney Yu, supra note 17. 
122 Commercial Cleaning, 271 F. 3d at 374. 
123 Id. at 378-79. 
124 See Sweeney Yu, supra note 17, at 946. 
125 See Zavala v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 393 F. Supp. 2d 295 (D.N.J. 2005). 
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1.   Corporations Have Utilized Civil RICO to Sue Competitors that 
Systematically and Unlawfully Employ Undocumented Immigrants to Gain a 
Competitive Advantage 
 
Although the INA amendment to RICO was enacted in 1996, it was not until 2000 that 
the new offenses were asserted in a civil RICO suit.126 Commercial Cleaning Services 
(“Commercial”) brought the lawsuit for damages against its direct competitor, Colin Service 
Systems (“Colin”).127 Commercial alleged that Colin engaged in a pattern of racketeering 
activity by hiring undocumented workers for profit in violation of Section 274 of the INA.128 
The district court dismissed the case based upon its belief that Commercial had no standing to 
bring suit because “its injury did not bear a ‘direct relation’ to Colin’s racketeering activity as 
required by Holmes.129 
Failing the Homes direct proximate cause requirement “precludes recovery by a party 
who simply complains of injury which flows from the misfortunes visited upon a third person by 
the defendant’s acts.”130 Commercial’s injury, according to the district court, was simply too far 
removed to substantiate a RICO claim.131 But if Commercial was not directly injured by Colin’s 
illegal hiring of the undocumented workers, it is difficult to imagine who was more directly 
injured.  It was established and undisputed that Commercial and Colin were direct competitors 
and that Colin’s lower employee wages, avoidance of employment taxes, and workers’ 
compensation insurance resulted in substantially lower contacts bids than Commercial could 
provide.  
 
The district court’s opinion failed to properly discuss the 1996 amendments to RICO’s 
predicate offenses.  It held that even if the defendant violated the INA, the Immigration and 
Naturalization Service (“INS”) bore the responsibility to deter those activities.  As illustrated 
earlier in this article, civil RICO can be, and according to the Legislature should be, used to 
assist in private enforcement against parties that unlawfully benefit through the utilization of 
illegal racketeering schemes.  The district court’s interpretation would virtually always require 
the proper plaintiff to be a government law enforcement agency. 
 
The district court supported its decision by citing to three cases that held violations of 
federal law is too remote for a private party to claim damages under RICO.132 However, each of 
 
126 See Commercial Cleaning Servs. v. Colin Serv. Systems, Inc, No. Civ.A. 3:99CV109, 2000 WL 545126, at *1 
(D. Conn. Mar. 21, 2000). 
127 See Commercial Cleaning Servs. v. Colin Serv. Systems, Inc., 271 F. 3d 374 (2001). 
128 See id. 
129 Commercial Cleaning, 2000 WL 545126, at *7-8. 
130 Id. at *3. 
131 See id. at *7. 
132 Id.; see also Medgar Evers Tenants Ass’n v. Medgar Evers Houses Associates, L.P., 25 F. Supp 2.d 116 
(E.D.N.Y. 1998) (dismissing RICO suit from tenants against a housing project association for injuries sustained as a 
result false and misleading statements to the U.S. Dept. of Housing and Urban Dev. (“HUD”)); Barr Lab., Inc. v. 
Quantum Pharmics, Inc., 827 F. Supp 111 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (dismissing RICO action from plaintiff drug 
manufacturer against a competitor when it learned it filed false applications with the Food and Drug 
Administration); Kingston Square Tenants Ass’n v. Tuskegee Gardens, Ltd., 792 F. Supp. 1566 (S.D. Fla. 1992) 
(dismissing RICO action against plaintiff tenant association against owners and managers of its housing complex 
because it filed multiple false applications for HUD funds and subsequently misused the obtained funds). 
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these cases were decided prior to 1996 or dealt with direct private enforcement of the INA 
statute, which is explicitly not permitted.  Conversely, this was not a case that required private 
enforcement of the INA, but rather it was the INA violations that established civil RICO standing 
under its predicate offenses provision.  Even assuming that Colin committed the alleged acts, the 
district court held that “[RICO’s] predicate offenses are aimed at avoiding compliance with the 
immigration laws and detection of those activities by the INS” and the plaintiff’s injuries were 
merely incidental to the defendants illegal activity.133 
Finally, and most damaging to Commercial’s position, the district court found that a jury 
would be required to make an impossible deduction in order to satisfy the Homes direct relation 
test.134 Specifically, it would be required to determine whether the plaintiff’s lost profits was 
primarily caused by lost lucrative contracts as a result of the Colin’s illegal hiring practices or 
because of other more removed reasons such as comparative quality, business reputations, 
fluctuations in demand, among other possible causes.   
 
Although the Second Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the lower court’s dismissal of the 
case, it did so without directly addressing many of the contentious issues.135 The appellate court 
found that in viewing Commercial’s complaint, Commercial adequately stated a proximate 
relationship between its injury and Colin’s pattern of alleged racketeering.136 The court turned 
directly to the language of the statute and took a bright line, formalistic RICO interpretation.137 
The decision recognized the difficulty in determining whether Commercial’s damages were 
‘directly’ caused by Colin’s unlawful practices.138 Holmes “expressly warned against applying a 
mechanical test detached from the policy considerations associated with the proximate cause 
analysis at play in the case.”139 Therefore, the court turned to the Holmes policy considerations 
in its analysis.140 
Reading the allegations in a light most favorable to the plaintiff,141 the Second Circuit 
Court of Appeals found that Commercial adequately stated a direct proximate relationship 
between its injury and Colin’s pattern of racketeering activity.142 In applying its version of the 
Holmes proximate cause test, the court found that the central factor of the district court’s 
dismissal was the difficulty for a jury in determining the cause of damages to the plaintiff.143 It 
rejected this as a proper reason for dismissal, citing the difficulty to determine exact cause of 
damages insufficient to dismiss this case.144 With more questions left unanswered than 
 
133 See Commercial Cleaning, 2000 WL 545126, at *7. 
134 See id. at *5-7. 
135 See Commercial Cleaning, 271 F. 3d at 374. 
136 See id. 
137 See id. 
138 See id. (citing Holmes v. Securities Investor Protection Corp. 503 U.S. 258, 272 n.20 (1992) (stressing the 
difficulty of achieving precision in creating a test for determining whether a plaintiff’s injury was sufficiently 
“direct” to permit standing under RICO). 
139 Id. (citing Holmes, 503 U.S. at 258). 
140 See id. 
141 See McLaughlin v. Anderson, 962 F. 2d 187, 189 (2d Cir. 1992). 
142 See Commercial Cleaning, 271 F. 3d at 374. 
143 See id. 
144 See id.; see also Firestone v. Galbreath, 976 F.2d 279 (C.A. 6th 1992). 
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answered, Colin swiftly settled the case for an undisclosed amount of money due to the risk of 
treble damages plus attorneys’ fees and costs.145 
The Commercial Cleaning district court applied Holmes to limit standing for nearly every 
private plaintiff against a competitor that uses an illegal scheme to damage the plaintiff.  As 
illustrated infra, this analysis is ultimately the position of the Supreme Court in Anza.146 Yet this 
interpretation severely limits the application of civil RICO in ways that Congress did not intend.  
Commercial Cleaning is based on nearly identical allegations those in Anza, except for the type 
of predicate offense.  Both situations provide facts that, on their face, fall squarely under the 
RICO statute.   
 
2.   Legally Employed Workers Terminated Because of Their Employer’s 
Unlawful Employment of Undocumented Workers Can Utilize Civil RICO to 
Recover Damages and Lost Wages 
 
In Mendoza v. Zirkle Fruit Co. (“Mendoza v. Zirkle”), decided only a few months after 
Commercial Cleaning,147 the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that allegations of illegal 
immigrant hiring is appropriately plead as a predicate offense for a RICO claim.148 After 
Commercial Cleaning, it was clear that its decision “told people [that] are competitively injured 
by the abuse of the immigration system” have a remedy under civil RICO.149 Plaintiff class 
representatives Olivia Mendoza and Juana Mendiola (collectively “Mendoza”) were lawfully 
employed by the defendants, Zirkle Fruit Company, Matson Fruit Company and Selective 
Employment Agency, Inc. (collectively “Zirkle”).150 
Mendoza alleged that Zirkle was engaged in two related illegal schemes to depress 
employee wages in violation of RICO.151 Like the district court in Commercial Cleaning, the 
district court in Mendoza v. Zirkle dismissed this suit because, in pertinent part, Mendoza lacked 
standing to pursue a claim under RICO.152 It found that although Mendoza properly alleged 
violation of federal immigration laws, Mendoza’s injury was “simply too speculative to survive 
the motion.”153 
The facts in the record were as follows: (1) beginning in 1996, Zirkle knowingly hired at 
least fifty undocumented workers per year as part of a scheme to depress employee wages; (2) 
Zirkle exploited these workers’ economic situation and fear of asserting their rights to drive the 
wage rate for both documented and undocumented workers to a level lower than it would be if 
defendants did not hire the undocumented workers; (3) the Immigration and Naturalization 
Service (“INS”) made findings that the majority of Zirkle and Matson’s workforce was 
 
145 See King, supra note 2. 
146 See discussion infra Part III.C.2. 
147 Mendoza v. Zirkle Fruit Co., 301 F. 3d 1163 (9th Cir. 2002). 
148 See Kathleen Harvey & Mira Mdivani, A Tough Balancing Act for Employers: RICO-Enhanced Liability Versus 
Discrimination Issues with the Noncitizen Worker, 73-DEC JKSBA 28, 29 (2004). 
149 See King, supra note 2 (quoting G. Robert Blakey, in NATIONAL L.J. (2001)). 
150 See Mendoza v. Zirkle Fruit Co., 2001 WL 33225470 (E.D. Wash Sept. 27, 2000). 
151 See id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1961 et seq.). 
152 See id. 
153 Id. 
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undocumented.154 Mendoza consequently argued that they were harmed by the lower wages paid 
from Zirkle because of their illegal immigrant hiring scheme.155 
As to whether Mendoza had standing to bring a RICO claim, Zirkle argued that “the 
plaintiffs lack[ed] standing to bring a RICO claim because they ha[d] not been injured by the 
defendants’ practices . . . ,”156 therefore they failed to satisfy 18 U.S.C § 1964(c).157 Zirkle 
asserted that the alleged injury did not confer standing because “(1) the injury was not 
proximately caused by the defendants’ alleged violations and (2) the claimed injury [was] not 
sufficiently concrete.”158 
The district court found this case to appear “superficially” similar to cases where 
plaintiffs allege predicate acts of making “false statements to, or otherwise misleading, 
governmental agencies.”159 In each of those cases, district courts found the plaintiffs to be 
merely indirect victims with the governmental agency as the direct proximately injured party.160 
Zirkle thus argued that it was the INS who was the directly injured victim because Zirkle filed 
false I-9 forms.161 
Yet those situations are clearly distinguishable from Mendoza v. Zirkle, under simple 
theories of economics.162 It was not the defendant’s misleading or false statements to the 
government that led to depressed wages, but rather Zirkle’s illegal hiring scheme that allowed it 
to save on the cost of labor.  Through the hiring of undocumented workers, Zirkle was able to 
increase the supply of cheap labor and decrease the demand for expensive, but legal, employees.  
The result thus used unlawful means to depress wages.  The distinct court agreed and further 
distinguished this case because the illegal hiring scheme alleged did not depend on any 
intervening action of a governmental agency or other third party.163 The district court thus found 
that Mendoza was a direct victim of Zirkle’s illegal hiring scheme.164 
However, the district court ultimately dismissed the case because of its belief that 
damages were impossible to calculate beyond sheer speculation.165 It stated that the plaintiff 
would have extremely difficultly in proving, “with the required specificity[,] what impact 
 
154 Id. at *2 (“The INS found that in 1998 74 % of Matson’s workforce (493 of 661 workers) was undocumented, 
and had been hired with false papers. The INS has made similar findings in the past against [] Zirkle.”). 
155 See id. 
156 Id. at *7. 
157 See id. (“RICO provides a private cause of action for damages only to those individuals “injured in [their] 
business or property by reason of” a violation of the law’s substantive provisions.”) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c)). 
158 Id. 
159 Id. at *8. 
160 See Mendoza, 2001 WL 33225470 (citing Medgar Evers House Tenants Ass’n v. Medgar Evers Houses Assoc., 
L.P., 25 F. Supp. 2d 116, 121 (E.D.N.Y. 1998)).  
161 See id. 
162 See e.g., Phillip L. Martin, The Economics of Immigration, FACTSNET.ORG, Apr. 23, 1996, 
http://www.facsnet.org/tools/nbgs/a_thru_h/e/ecnimmigr.php3; Ruben Navarrette Jr., Economic Realities of 
Immigration, S.F. CHRON., Apr. 5, 2006, available at http://www.sfgate.com/cgi 
bin/article.cgi?file=/chronicle/archive/2006/04/05/EDGNSGUANP1.DTL. 
163 See Mendoza, 2001 WL 33225470. 
164 See id. at *10 
165 See id.; see also Commercial Cleaning, 2000 WL 545126, at *7 (finding the plaintiffs damages too speculative). 
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[Zirkle’s] alleged wrongdoing has had in the context of the whole labor market.”166 
Consequently, the district court dismissed on Mendoza’s failure to allege “a sufficiently non-
speculative” financial loss as a result of Zirkle’s wrongdoing.167 
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals disagreed with the dismissal due to the “speculative” 
nature of the damages.168 It, like the district court, first found that Zirkle’s alleged scheme was 
intended to give the employer a contract advantage at the expense of the legal workers.  The 
court also noted that that the undocumented workers cannot “be counted on to bring suit for the 
law’s vindication.”169 Therefore, both the district court and court of appeals found that the 
Mendoza plaintiffs were the direct victims of the alleged scheme.170 
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, though, reversed the district court’s decision as to 
the speculative nature of Mendoza’s damages.171 It held that Mendoza “singularly [has] the 
ability to define wages in this labor market. . . ,”172 and found that the Mendoza plaintiffs must be 
allowed to make their case through the presentation of evidence.173 The amount of damages is a 
factual question that is proper for a jury, not a question of law to be decided at the summary 
judgment stage of the case.174 The Ninth Circuit distinguished between uncertainty in the fact of 
damage and in the amount of damages.175 Indeed, Zirkle does not argue any risk of multiple 
fiscal recovery.176 Even if that were the case, lawsuits with multiple potential plaintiffs who can 
recover for the “alleged illegal hiring scheme would not threaten multiple recovery of passed-on 
harm.”177 
Immediately following this decision, Mendoza settled with Zirkle for $1.3 million, the 
first settlement of an illegal immigrant wage depression suit in United States history.178 
Additionally, the class members and legal workers also received back pay for each hour worked 
in the company’s warehouse and fruit orchards from 1999 to 2004.179 Although Zirkle did not 
 
166 See Mendoza, 2001 WL 33225470. 
167 Id. 
168 Mendoza v. Zirkle Fruit Co., 301 F. 3d 1163 (9th Cir. 2002) 
169 Id. (citing Holmes, 503 U.S. at 273; cf. Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137 (2002) 
(holding that undocumented workers are not entitled to backpay wrongfully withheld in a labor dispute).  But see 
Zavala v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 393 F. Supp. 2d 295 (D.N.J. 2005) (holding that undocumented workers may bring 
a RICO violation claim). 
170 This position is now arguably in conflict with the Supreme Court’s Anza decision, discussed supra in Part III.C.1.  
It is supported, however, by the position of the Eleventh Circuit’s Mohawk decision, discussed supra in Part III.C.2. 
171 See Mendoza, 301 F. 3d at 1163. 
172 Id. at 1170-71. 
173 See id. at 1171. 
174 See id. 
175 Id. (citing Knutson v. Daily Review, Inc., 548 F. 2d 795, 811 (9th Cir. 1976) (“Different standards govern proof 
of the fact and proof of the amount of damages.”). 
176 Id. at 1171 (9th Cir. 2002). 
177 Id. (citing Commercial Cleaning, 271 F. 3d at 383-84) (“Suits with different classes of plaintiffs, each of which 
suffered a different concrete injury, proximately caused by the violation” are not barred). 
178 See Leah Beth Ward, Zirkle Settles Job Suit, YAKIMA HERALD-REPUBLIC (WASH.), Dec. 30, 2005, available at 
http://www.amren.com/mtnews/archives/2005/12/zirkle_settles_job_suit.php. 
179 See Orchardist to Pay $1.3 Million to Settle Undocumented Hiring Class Action, 35 FARM EMPLOYERS LABOR 
SERV. MON. NEWSLETTER 3, available at http://www.fels.org/news/News0603.htm. 
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admit any guilt of wrongdoing, it cited the risk of treble damages plus attorneys’ fees and costs 
as the motivating factor to settle.180 
This line of reasoning in Mendoza v. Zirkle was also adopted by the sixth circuit in 
Trollinger v. Tyson Foods (“Trollinger v. Tyson”).181 In Trollinger v. Tyson, the plaintiffs class 
representatives (collectively “Trollinger”) brought a civil RICO action against the defendant 
(“Tyson”) due to a wage-related dispute.182 “On behalf of themselves and a putative class of 
similarly-situated workers, the four employees allege that Tyson violated RICO by engaging in a 
scheme with several employment agencies to depress the wages of Tyson’s hourly employees by 
hiring illegal immigrants.”183 
Trollinger v. Tyson was initially dismissed by the district court due to a Holmes direct 
proximate cause attack where Tyson argued that the employee’s union was the appropriate 
plaintiff. Tyson also argued that Trollinger could not establish a “‘direct relation between the 
injury asserted and the injurious conduct alleged.’”184 The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals 
reversed the district court stating that dismissal in this stage of the proceedings was not proper 
“[g]iven the unadorned allegations in the complaint, given the requirement that we must assume 
plaintiffs will be able to prove them, and given the absence of any discovery (or expert 
reports).”185 
3.  Undocumented Workers Can Sue Employers that Profit from Systematically 
Employing, Harboring, and Trafficking Them in Order to Gain an Unfair 
Competitive Advantage 
 
Possibly the most innovative approach taken in bringing a civil RICO claim related to an 
INA offense occurred Zavala v. Wal-Mart (“Wal-Mart”).186 This case stemmed from a sting by 
the United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement against janitors and their respective 
contractors at Wal-Mart.  As part of “Operation Rollback,” federal agents arrested hundreds of 
janitors, including twelve of the plaintiffs (collectively “Zavala”) in this action for immigration 
violations.187 This was not the first time that a Wal-Mart contractor was alleged to have 
participated in immigration-related offenses,188 although Wal-Mart denied having any knowledge 
of any use of that company’s undocumented labor.189 “Because of this alleged pattern of 
conduct, Wal-Mart ha[d] been under investigation by federal law enforcement authorities for 
over five years.”190 
180 See id. 
181 Trollinger v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 370 F. 3d 602 (6th Cir. 2004). 
182 See id. 
183 Id. 
184 Id. (quoting Holmes, 503 U.S. at 268) (“As the wage rates were the product of collective bargaining, [Trollinger] 
cannot demonstrate that those rates were ultimately depressed by the presence of alleged illegal aliens in the work 
force.”) (quoting Trollinger v. Tyson, 214 F. Supp. 2d 840 (E.D. Tenn 2003) 
185 Id. at 619. 
186 Zavala v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 393 F. Supp 2d 295 (D.N.J. 2005). 
187 Id. 
188 Id. 
189 Id. 
190 Id. 
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 Zavala alleged that Wal-Mart systematically employed, harbored, and trafficked in the labor 
of immigrants, aided and abetted violation of the immigration laws, failed to pay their wages and 
overtime and benefits as required, and concealed their profits and practices from detection.191 
The exploitation by Wal-Mart occurred in a number of different ways including obligating them 
to work in excess of the statutory maximum number of hours, every day of the week, denying 
them of lawful pay and benefits under the FLSA, as well as time for sick leave, meals or breaks, 
and paying them in cash without withholding payroll taxes.192 Wal-Mart also “easily could, and 
did, hide them from law enforcement authorities, by threatening them with deportation or 
locking them into the stores for the duration of their shifts.”193 
Wal-Mart provided the potential for undocumented workers to recover treble damages with 
attorney’s fees and costs for their substantial injuries.  This case ultimately failed under the 
predicate offenses and “racketeering activity” requirements under the statute, yet the court’s 
opinion did not find issue with these plaintiffs under a direct proximate cause analysis.  It is quite 
clear that the Zavala plaintiffs did not benefit from the illegal actions of the defendant, as 
purported by Wal-Mart.  These workers were exploited, locked in janitor’s closets, lacked any 
benefits, worked seven days a week, and were paid minimum wage.  However, Wal-Mart was 
dismissed due to the lack of proper pleading under RICO, not due to any direct proximate cause 
limitation.  Therefore, under a different set of facts or with proper pleading, this case may have 
resulted in a favorable award for the undocumented workers. 
 
C.   Statutory Interpretation and Court’s Various Methods of Analyzing and 
Applying Civil RICO 
 
As noted throughout this article, there has been long-standing and “widespread judicial 
animosity” towards the pervasive utilization of civil RICO.194 And although Congress has been 
keenly aware of the many issues courts have expressed with the statute since at least the early 
1980s, it has continued to expand, not limit, RICO beyond its mafia fighting roots. As mentioned 
supra, even former Chief Justice Rehnquist pled to Congress to limit civil RICO jurisdiction 
without avail.195 In the beginning, however, the Supreme Court “rebuffed [] attempts to restrict 
standing for civil RICO claims, noting that the wide application of the statute is ‘inherent in the 
statute as written, and its correction must lie with Congress.’”196 
Because RICO requires a congressionally mandated broad application and the possibility 
of treble damages as well as attorneys’ fees and costs, the statute was clearly subject to misuse.  
 
191 See id. 
192 See id. 
193 Id. 
194 Patrick Wackerly, Personal Versus Property Harm and Civil RICO Standing, 73 UNIV. OF CHI. L. REV. 1513, 
1515 (2006) (citing Sedima, SPRL v. Imrex Co., Inc., 741 F.2d 482, 287 (2d Cir. 1984), rev’d 473 U.S. 479 (1985) 
(stating that the exploitation of private civil RICO is “extraordinary, if not outrageous)); see also In re The Dow Co. 
“Sarabond” Products Liability Lit., 666 F. Supp 1466, 1470-70 (D. Colo. 1987) (declaring civil RICO as “a 
recurring nightmare” and “a rather sloppily thought out kind of way to get the Mafia that everybody jumps on so 
they can have more fun with fraud”). 
195 See Rehnquist, supra note 31; see also Rehnquist: Cut Jurisdiction, 75 A.B.A.J. 22 (Apr. 1989). 
196 Wackerly, supra note 231 (citing Sedima, 473 U.S. 499 (reversing the Second Circuit’s decision that limited 
standing under section 1964(c))). 
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Before this issue reached the Supreme Court for the first time, “[a] number of courts recognized 
the potential for abuse . . . and created limitations to narrow [civil RICO’s] reach.”197 Although 
these courts in the early 1980s experienced much of the same issues that still persist today with 
civil RICO, the Supreme Court’s holding in Sedima S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co. was clear to defer the 
policy issue of RICO’s seemingly limitless application to Congress.198 
Although similar standing issues that plagued civil RICO decades ago still remain today, 
the context is entirely different.  In the 1970s and 1980s, it was clear that Congress enacted 
RICO to combat organized crime. Therefore, if courts were to interpret the words of civil RICO 
in light of its congressional intent back then, it is understandable that some courts interpreted 
RICO as “directed at the archetypal, intimidating mobster.”199 Even back in the 1980s, however, 
the Supreme Court chose not to read beyond the plain text of the statute and found that civil 
RICO permitted broad application to even ordinary fraud cases.200 
Today, civil RICO application is much more complicated.  Because the statute has been 
amended numerous times in a manner that expands the statute beyond organized crime, and 
because the mafia has a significantly less impact on today’s society, it is unreasonable to argue 
that the statute should only be applicable to those affected by mafia related crimes.  In fact, civil 
RICO’s primary use for the past decade, at least, has not against the mafia.  These facts should 
promote the Supreme Court’s continued ‘plain language’ statutory interpretation of the statue 
instead of deferring to the statutes original purpose.  RICO was seemingly effective against 
fighting organized crime, why should the Court interject a narrowing application against illegal 
immigration or fraud?  Both of these issues greatly affect the United State’s economy as much, 
or even more, than organized crime in the late 1970s and early 1980s. 
 
1.  The Supreme Court Should Interpret Statutes Using its “Plain Language” 
Unless the Language is Ambiguous or the Result Would be Absurd 
 
As the Supreme Court recently stated, the starting point discerning congressional intent is 
the existing statutory text,201 and not the predecessor statutes.202 “It is well established that 
‘when the statute’s language is plain, the sole function of the courts-at least where disposition 
required by the text is not absurd-is to enforce it according to its terms.’”203 Additionally, the 
Supreme Court can “construe the language so as to give effect to the intent of Congress.”204 Yet, 
there “is no invariable rule of the discovery of that intention.  To take a few words from their 
context . . . isolated to attempt to determine their meaning, certainly would not contribute greatly 
to the discovery of the purpose of the draftsmen of a statute . . . .”205 It is only when that 
 
197 Faisal Shah, Broadening the Scope of Civil RICO: Sedima S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 20 U.S.F. L. REV. 339, 342 
(1986).  See, e.g,, Hokama v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 566 F. Supp. 636, 643 (C.D. Cal. 1983) (requiring some 
connection to organized crime); Harper v. New Japan Secs. Int’l Inc., 545 F. Supp. 1002, 1007 (C.D. Cal. 1982) 
(requiring injury by a RICO violation, not by the predicate acts). 
198 See Sedima, 473 U.S. 479 (1985). 
199 Shaih, supra note 234, at 354. 
200 See id. 
201 See Hughes Aircraft Co. v. Jacobson, 525 U.S. 432 (1999). 
202 See Lamie v. U.S. Trustee, 540 U.S. 526 (2004). 
203 Id.; see also Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Union Planters Bank, N.A., 530 U.S. 1, 6 (2000). 
204 U.S. v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 310 U.S. 534, 542 (1940). 
205 Id. 
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meaning “has led to absurd or futile results, however, that [the Supreme Court] has looked 
beyond the words to the purpose of the Act.206 
This statutory construction employed by the Supreme Court has not substantially changed 
since Minor v. Mechanics’ Bank of Alexandria207 in 1828.  Thus, when the language of a statute 
is unambiguous, the Court should presume that Congress “said what it meant and meant what it 
said.”208 Only in the “rare cases [in which] the literal application of a statute will produce a 
result demonstrably at odds with the intentions of its drafters . . . [should] the intention of the 
drafters, rather than the strict language, control[].”209 
Statutory interpretation is almost never as straightforward as it seems, and interpreting 
the RICO statute is no exception.   RICO has been declared one of the most complicated federal 
laws and its interpretation is therefore exceedingly more difficult than most other laws.210 
However, difficulty in interpretation as to the scope of the statute is a matter for Congress to 
amend if it so intends and not for Supreme Court. 
 
2.  The Supreme Court Has Historically Deferred Policy Issues to Congress 
Regarding Civil RICO’s Broad Application 
 
The “Civil remedies” provision of RICO asserts that “[a]ny person injured in his business 
or property by reason of a violation of section 1962 of this chapter may sue . . . .”211 The 
language of this provision is clear and unambiguous, therefore the Supreme Court should provide 
a ‘plain meaning’ interpretation unless the result is be absurd.212 RICO’s broad mandate to 
liberally construe the statute illustrates congressional intent not narrowly tailor it in the best 
interest of the judiciary. 
 
In Sedima, the Supreme Court “rejected a restrictive interpretation of § 1964(c) that 
would have made it a condition for maintaining a civil RICO action both that the defendant had 
already been convicted of a predicate racketeering act or of a RICO violation. . . “213 Even in 
1989, the Supreme Court “acknowledged concern . . . over civil RICO’s use against ‘legitimate’ 
businesses, as well as ‘mobsters and organized criminals.’”214 Yet, in Sedima, the case was 
exceedingly more difficult to figure out what constituted a “pattern of racketeering activities,” as 
proscribed in the statute.215 The Supreme Court, first in Holmes, and now in Anza, had to 
determine who had standing to sue under the language of 18 U.S.C. 1964(c).   
 
206 Id. 
207 26 U.S. 48 (1828). 
208 United States v. Steele, 147 F.3d 1316, 1318 (11th Cir. 1998). 
209 Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 571 (1982). 
210 See United States v. Anderson, 626 F.2d 1358 (8th Cir. 1980) 
211 18 U.S.C. 1964(c) (emphasis added). 
212 See Lamie, 540 U.S. at 526. 
213 See H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Telephone Co., 492 U.S. 229, 236 (1989) (citing Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex 
Co., 473 U.S. 479 (1985)). 
214 Id.  
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 Nothing in the language of the statute suggests that “by reason of” equals “most directly 
affected.”  But, as illustrated supra in both Part I.B and Part II.B, Congress, the Supreme Court, 
and lower courts have different standards as to how far civil RICO’s standing boundaries can 
reach.  Lower courts even disagree with each other as to what are the important factors to 
determine whether a plaintiff has standing to sue.  This has led to conflicting, confusing, and 
unpredictable decisions that can consume six years to litigate with two, possibly three reversals.  
 
3.   The Competing RICO Interpretations by District Courts, Circuit Courts of 
Appeal, and the Supreme Court     
 
The pattern of each of these civil RICO cases is strikingly similar.  District courts, which 
have long voiced concern with the far-reaching scope of civil RICO, have uniformly dismissed 
each of the aforementioned lawsuits for either lack of sufficient direct proximate cause or 
speculative damages.  The appellate court’s decisions all reversed the district courts, holding that 
Congress intended a broad application of RICO so long as the requisite elements are sufficiently 
plead.  Additionally, the ‘speculative nature’ of alleged damages should be a question of fact left 
for a jury to decide and should not lead to dismissal of the claim.  In the middle of the two sides 
is the Supreme Court, which has, up until Anza, taken the approach that permit most civil RICO 
claims to proceed and defers the policy issues with the statute to Congress. 
 
The RICO statute, although unpopular in the judiciary system because of its difficult and 
broad application, has seemingly been used successfully in curbing many unlawful schemes used 
by individuals and corporations to achieve a competitive advantage.  Profiting on illegal activity 
such as systematic fraud or violations of the INA can be controlled through the use of the 
powerful, broad sweeping statute of civil RICO.  There are protective measures built into the 
statute, such as a ‘By reason of’ element and a requisite pattern of unlawful activity, as well as 
related damages suffered, which protect courts from unsubstantiated claims.  However, Anza has 
essentially eliminated the civil RICO cause of action by any party other than a governmental law 
enforcement agency.  This goes against the legislative intent that civil RICO be available to 
allow ‘private attorneys general’  in holding those who violate the law liable for their actions. 
 
It is clear that there are two areas that courts most commonly disagree that influence the 
outcome in most civil RICO cases.  First, a court must decide whether it believes “By reason of” 
must be the “most directly injured” party to the defendant’s actions, or whether merely showing 
“direct injury” is enough. Private plaintiffs argue that the most directly injured party will always 
be a government plaintiff because it is always an illegal act that permits a RICO claim.  This 
would therefore frustrate congressional intent, as the enforcement agency with the power of 
enforcing that illicit action would be the only proper plaintiff in a RICO suit.  As stated supra in 
Part I.A. and I.B., Congress added a civil form of RICO to assist law enforcement in allowing 
private parties the ability to become a “private attorney general” to recover its damages and 
reduce illicit activity (i.e. a predicate offense of RICO).   
 
Yet, courts that seek to restrict the broad reach of civil RICO can limit these claims by 
holding that only the most directly injured party can bring suit.  Incidentally, this has also limited 
unpopular class actions civil RICO lawsuits, which usually have several millions of dollars at 
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stake.216 While this may be a desirable result for the judiciary, courts are not allowed to legislate 
from the bench where Congress has had the opportunity to limit civil RICO for thirty years and 
has failed to do so. 
 
Second, and mostly beyond the scope of this article but still important to standing in 
RICO claims, is the issue of damages.  On the one hand, restrictive courts find that any party that 
cannot show concrete damages, but rather what it calls speculative damages, must lead to the 
dismissal of a RICO claim.  This is especially true in RICO actions related to employment law at 
issue because concrete damages for depressed wages would be very difficult to illustrate absent 
expert testimony or detailed evidence that may not be available to the plaintiffs.  Therefore, 
dismissal for speculative damages at the summary judgment phase of a RICO claim ultimately 
limits the statutory scope of civil RICO, albeit through indirect means.  However, other courts 
counter this problem with two answers.  First, even though it may be difficult to calculate 
damages in some civil RICO claims, difficulty of calculation is not a sufficient reason for 
dismissal.  Second, damages are most commonly a question of fact and not law; therefore it is 
proper for a jury, not a judge, to decide this question. 
 
D.   The New “Direct Proximate Cause” Limitation to RICO 
 
The expansion of civil RICO in Commercial Cleaning and its subsequent line of RICO 
cases did not go unnoticed by the United States Supreme Court.  In its 2006 term, the Supreme 
Court granted certiorari to two civil RICO cases, Anza217 and Mohawk Industries v. Williams 
(“Mohawk Industries”), in what turned out to be a disguised effort to restrict the direct proximate 
cause limitation first purported in Holmes.218 However, the tension between Congress, the 
United States Supreme Court, and various circuits will not end here.   
 
This section will first analyze the Supreme Court’s analysis of Anza and its efforts to 
limit future use of civil RICO in private plaintiff lawsuits between corporations such as those in 
Commercial Cleaning, Trollinger v. Tyson, and Mendoza. Although this was a clear attempt to 
restrict civil RICO claims under a statutory standing analysis, it will ultimately fail to limit these 
claims under a literal reading of the statute, as illustrated in the remanded decision by the 
Eleventh Circuit in Mohawk Industries, published on September 27, 2006.219 The next section 
will analyze this most recent Eleventh Circuit Mohawk Industries decision to determine what 
impact, if any, the decision in Anza has on future competitor claims under civil RICO.  The final 
section will discuss the current issues and conflicts with the Supreme Court and lower courts’ 
interpretations of RICO 
 
1.   The Supreme Court in Anza Directly Impacted Private Plaintiffs’ Ability to 
Bring a Claim By Further Narrowing the Holmes’ Direct Proximate Cause 
Limitation in Civil RICO  
 
216 See Gordon, supra note 113, at 332 (“The elephant in the room during many discussions of RICO causation is the 
context in which the standards” for proving causation matters most: class actions). 
217 Anza v. Ideal Steel Supply Corp., 126 S. Ct. 1991 (June 5, 2006) 
218 See id.; Mohawk Indus. v. Williams, 126 S. Ct. 2016 (June 5, 2006). 
219 See Williams v. Mohawk Indus., 465 F.3d 1277 (11th Cir. 2006). 
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 Anza’s facts look similar to those in Commercial Cleaning, with the primary difference 
being the type of predicate offense under civil RICO.220 Ideal Steel Supply Corporation 
(“Ideal”) sold “steel mill products along with related supplies and services [and] operate[d] two 
store locations in New York.”221 Ideal had only one principal competitor, National Steel Supply 
(“National”), owned by Joseph and Vincent Anza, which offered similar products and services in 
its two New York stores. 
 
The scheme in Anza is relatively simple compared to those in most RICO cases.  Ideal 
claimed that National “engaged in an unlawful racketeering scheme aimed at ‘gain[ing] sales and 
market share at Ideal’s expense.’”222 National allegedly did not charge sales tax to its cash-
paying customers on transactions that were not exempt from sales tax under New York state 
law.223 This allowed National to reduce its prices without affecting its profit margin, and as a 
result, National had to file fraudulent tax returns to the New York State Department of Taxation 
and Finance in an effort to conceal this conduct.224 
This last fact led to severe consequences for the Anza plaintiffs.  The Supreme Court 
confused National’s tax return actions with Ideal’s alleged injury.  Where in fact, Ideal never 
alleged that the actual filing of the fraudulent tax forms caused injury to Ideal, but rather 
National’s fraudulent tax fraud scheme allowed National to lower its costs than Ideal could 
afford.  Ideal’s complaint asserted “that [National’s] goal, which they achieved, was to give 
National a competitive advantage over Ideal.”225 Consequently, the illegal actions of National 
(tax fraud) and injury to Ideal (lost customers and unlawful competitive advantage) should have 
been adequate to satisfy a civil RICO pleading requirements. 
 
Yet, the Supreme Court disagreed.  According to the Court, its analysis “beg[an]-and [] 
largely end[ed] - with Holmes.”226 By alleging that the tax and mail fraud activities of National 
were the basis for the predicate offenses under RICO, the Supreme Court opened the door to a 
direct proximate cause restriction.  In its own words: 
 
Ideal’s theory is that [National] harmed it by defrauding the New York tax 
authority and using the proceeds from the fraud to offer lower prices designed to 
attract more customers.  The RICO violation alleged by Ideal is that [National’s 
owners] conducted National’s affairs through a pattern of mail fraud and wire 
fraud.  The direct victim of this conduct was the State of New York, not Ideal.  It 
was the State that was being defrauded and the State that lost tax revenue as a 
result.227 
220 Compare Anza, 126 S. Ct. 1991 (alleging tax fraud), with Commercial Cleaning Servs. v. Colin Serv. Systems, 
Inc., 271 F. 3d 374 (2001) (alleging violations of the INA). 
221 Anza, 126 S. Ct. at 1994. 
222 Id. 
223 See id. 
224 Ideal alleged that “[National] submit[ed] [] fraudulent tax returns, [and] committed various acts of mail fraud and 
wire fraud,” which are proper forms of racketeering activity for purposes of RICO because “the fraudulent returns 
were submitted on an ongoing and regular basis.” Id.; see also 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)(B). 
225 Anza, 126 S. Ct. at 1995. 
226 Id. 
227 Id. at 1997. 
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This remarkable quote was fatal to Ideal’s case.  The Supreme Court, however, inadvertently 
limited itself to a narrow holding.  Rather than looking to National’s offense and the injury 
sustained to Ideal by National’s acts, the Court decided this case on a technicality using a 
formalistic interpretation of Ideal’s pleadings.   
 
This decision by Supreme Court is an attempt to limit civil RICO in an unprecedented 
manner.  As pointedly (and properly) stated by Justice Thomas in his dissent:  
 
The Court today limit[ed] the lawsuits that may be brought under the civil 
enforcement provision of [RICO] by adopting a theory of proximate causation 
that is supported neither by the Act nor by our decision in [Holmes], on which the 
Court principally relies. . . .  [The Court’s] stringent proximate-causation 
requirement succeeds in precluding recovery . . . for plaintiffs whose injuries are 
precisely those that Congress aimed to remedy through the authorization of civil 
RICO suits.228 
It is clearly within the facts of Anza that Ideal was directly and proximately injured by the 
unlawful acts by National, which were predicate acts under the RICO statute.  The decision of 
the Majority goes against the broad congressional mandate to liberally construe RICO.229 The 
Anza majority distorted facts in who was directly injured in a manner that is largely outcome 
determinative.  Ideal never alleged that it was injured because the State of New York did not 
receive taxes, as purported by the Supreme Court majority.  
 
Rather, it was National’s practice of not charging tax to cash-paying customers that 
permitted National to undercut Ideal’s prices and steal its customers.  Whereas New York would 
seek only payment of back taxes and any associated penalties, Ideal is seeking to remedy itself, 
not with the taxes that National saved, but on Ideal’s lost business and profits due to National’s 
unlawful activity.   
 
This misinterpretation of damages allowed the Court to find a separation between the 
alleged predicate acts, and the damages sustained by Ideal.  As such, Justice Thomas noted that:  
 
It is not fair to require a plaintiff to prove that the tort caused the lower of prices 
at the motion to dismiss stage. . . . The allegation that . . . National was able to 
charge a lower price after tax because of its fraud suffices to permit Ideal to 
survive a motion to dismiss on the question whether the prices were lowered due 
to the fraud, as opposed to other factors.230 
Most importantly, “[t]he Court . . . permits a defendant to evade liability for harms that are not 
only foreseeable, but the intended consequences of the defendant’s unlawful behavior.”231 This 
allows a defendant, which “is plainly morally responsible” for acts to an easily identifiable 
 
228 Id. 
229 Id. at 2000. 
230 Id. at 2003 n.5. 
231 Id. at 2004. 
28 
plaintiff to avoid punishment where there is “no basis in the RICO statute, in common-law tort, 
or in Holmes for reaching this result.”232 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Anza is likely a result of the widespread “[j]udicial 
sentiment that civil RICO’s evolution is undesirable.”233 For these reasons, courts can now 
preclude precisely the claims the Congress aimed to protect.234 At this stage of the lawsuit, it is 
not for the court to decide the merits of the claim, but whether Ideal had properly plead the 
elements under RICO.  After the Supreme Court decided Anza, the decision was cited in more 
than fifteen decisions within three months to support dismissal of a RICO claim based on a direct 
proximate cause analysis. 
 
2.  The Eleventh Circuit Distinguished Mohawk From Anza Although it is Unclear 
Whether the Eleventh Circuit’s Decision Was Correctly Decided in Light of 
the Supreme Court’s Decision 
 
Anza was one of two civil RICO cases that the Supreme Court granted certiorari to in 
2006.   While the Supreme Court originally granted writ to Mohawk Industries on the certified 
question of “[w]hether a defendant corporation and its agents can constitute an “enterprise” 
under [RICO], in light of the settled rule that a RICO defendant must “conduct” or “participate 
in” the affairs of some larger enterprise and not just its own affairs,”235 the Court would never 
answer this question.  Rather, certiorari was “dismissed as improvidently granted” in light of 
Anza and remanded the case down to the Eleventh Circuit “for further consideration.”236 
It is no stretch to infer from the Supreme Court’s Anza decision that it believed that 
Mohawk Industries should be dismissed for lack of direct proximate cause.  Otherwise, the 
Supreme Court would have viewed Mohawk Industries’ deficiencies as unique from those in 
Anza and subsequently answer the certified question.  Despite this, the Eleventh Circuit chose to 
distinguish Mohawk Industries from Anza.
The facts of Mohawk Industries are as follows: 1) Mohawk Industries is the second 
largest carpet and rug manufacturer in the United States;237 2) allegedly Mohawk, with its 
recruiting agencies, hired and harbored undocumented workers in an effort to depress wages;238 
3) the plaintiffs (collectively “Williams”) alleged that in addition to recruiting employees at the 
United States–Mexican border, Mowhak concealed its efforts to hire illegal immigrants by 
destroying documents and in assisting illegal workers in evading detection by law 
enforcement;239 4) this, in turn, permitted Mohawk in lowering labor costs by reducing the 
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number of legal workers it must hire, which consequently depressed the wages it pays legal 
hourly workers.240 
The facts of Mohawk look most similar to those in Mendoza v. Zirkle, where the 
defendant unlawfully depressed wages through a scheme to hire illegal immigrants.  In Mendoza 
v. Zirkle, both the district court and Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals believed that the Mendoza 
plaintiffs were the most directly injured by its employer’s illegal hiring scheme.  Both the district 
court and the court of appeals in Mendoza v. Zirkle believed that immigration enforcement 
officers or another governmental agency (like the IRS) were most directly injured by Zirkle’s 
unlawful acts.  In that case, it was the speculation of damages and whether Mendoza could 
illustrate actual damages that both courts struggled to determine.  Ultimately, the Ninth Circuit 
found that Mendoza’s case should be allowed to go forward and both parties subsequently 
settled. 
 
The case of Mohawk Industries illustrates the clash between direct proximate cause and 
damages.  Under nearly identical facts as Mendoza v. Zirkle, the Supreme Court viewed the 
weakness in this case as one of direct proximate cause.  Now, with Anza recently decided, 
RICO’s new direct proximate cause limitation potentially restricted the scope of all private 
plaintiffs injured in a matter that could conceivably be indirect (e.g., the governmental 
enforcement agency is the most directly injured).  Here, like in Anza, the injuries sustained by 
Williams could be due to several factors other than the employment of undocumented workers.  
Mohawk Industries never paid the workers below minimum wage, although the wages were 
below other similar businesses in the city (e.g., speculation of damages argument).  Mohawk, 
being one of the largest carpet and rug manufacturer in the world, has considerable influence and 
flexibility of the wages it pays employees.   
 
Unlike Anza, however, Williams did not allege any tax or mail fraud conspiracies (e.g., 
the hiring of undocumented workers led to lower wage taxes or benefit compensation).  It is 
reasonable, under the formalistic approach by the Supreme Court, that immigration enforcement 
agencies may be the most directly injured by Mohawks unlawful labor practice.  This would be 
analogous the Court’s Anza decision where the New York State Department of Taxation was the 
most directly affected by Ideal’s tax fraud scheme. 
 
Fortunately for the plaintiffs in Mohawk Industries, the Eleventh Circuit distinguished the 
Supreme Court’s Anza decision.  In point of fact, instead of a “direct proximate cause” analysis 
(which the Supreme Court analogized to the most directly and proximately injured), the Eleventh 
Circuit labeled its Holmes analysis “‘By Reason Of’ (or a broad interpretation of “direct 
proximate cause”) the substantive RICO violations.”241 The Eleventh Circuit cited Trollinger v. 
Tyson for its “by reason of” test242 where the plaintiffs must show: (1) a sufficiently direct injury 
so that a plaintiff has standing to sue; and (2) proximate cause.243 Making this distinction is 
important because it removes the level of directness required under Anza and has a lower burden 
of directness of the injury sustained by the plaintiff.   
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The Supreme Court was likely asserting that the proper RICO plaintiff would be the 
governmental law enforcement agency (in this case Immigration and Customs Enforcement) 
affected by the defendant’s illegal actions.  Whereas, the Eleventh Circuit’s subtle difference 
allows multiple proper RICO plaintiffs so long as the injury was a direct and proximate result of 
the defendant’s actions.  This limitation difference is critical in a RICO standing analysis and 
continues to be the factor most commonly used to limit civil RICO claims.   
 
The Mohawk Industries court was able to reconcile its decision under Holmes and Anza 
by asserting that Holmes allowed “directly injured victims . . . to vindicate the law as ‘private 
attorneys general,’ without any of the problems attendant upon suits by plaintiffs injured more 
remotely.”244 The court looked at the Williams plaintiffs’ allegations as true in Mohawk’s 
motion to dismiss and was able to conclude sufficient proximate cause.  The court also rejected 
Mohawk’s claims that other economic factors contributed to Williams’ alleged wage depression 
(‘speculative damages’ argument).245 The Eleventh Circuit’s decision dealt with both limitations 
in civil RICO.  It found direct proximate cause under the Holmes and Anza standard can include 
private plaintiffs and not just governmental enforcement agencies; and it found that even 
difficult to calculate damages are a question of fact proper for a jury and not an appropriate 
limitation at the summary judgment stage. 
 
The Eleventh Circuit found that concerns in Holmes and Anza, where there may have 
been a more directly injured party, simply did not apply in this case.  The court explicitly stated 
that 
 
[t]here is no more direct injured party who could bring suit. Mohawk posits the 
United States as the only other victim because of its interest in enforcing 
immigration laws.  But as plaintiffs aptly point out, the United States is 
responsible for all federal criminal laws, which includes RICO’s other predicate 
acts.  Under Mohawk’s theory, the United States would arguably be the most 
direct victim of all RICO predicate, criminal acts. Congress, however, 
criminalized the employment of illegal workers in part to protect legal workers.  It 
is consistent with civil RICO’s purposes – to expand enforcement beyond federal 
prosecutors with limited public resources – to turn victims (here, Mohawk’s legal 
workers) into prosecutors as private attorneys general seeking to eliminate illegal 
hiring activity by their own employer.246 
This statement precisely describes the tension between the United States Supreme Court and 
Congress.  While the Supreme Court has limited civil RICO’s statutory scope, Congress, like 
Eleventh Circuit, never intended such limitations.  Now, depending on a court’s statutory 
interpretation, civil RICO will continue to produce unpredictable, and often conflicting, 
decisions without reliable means of predictability. 
 
244 Id. (citing Holmes, 503 U.S. at 269-270). 
245 Id. at 1289. 
246 Id. at 1290 
31 
 In response to the Eleventh Circuit’s decision, which mostly circumvented the Supreme 
Court’s Anza decision, the Mohawk defendants have again filed for certiorari to the Supreme 
Court on December 19, 2006.247 In its petition, Mohawk argues that “[t]he Eleventh Circuit’s 
ratification of [Williams’ theory of a RICO offense] is at odds with [the Supreme Court’s 
holding] . . . in Anza.”248 It further alleged that the “Eleventh Circuit ignored the central holding 
of Anza–that RICO civil plaintiffs must plead an injury directly caused by the RICO predicate 
acts and not by another ‘set of actions . . . entirely distinct from the alleged RICO violation.”249 
Instead, Mohawk alleged that “the Eleventh Circuit fundamentally misread Anza to hold that it is 
enough for civil RICO standing where there is some ‘correlation’ between the predicate act 
(illegal hiring) and the asserted injury (depressed wage levels).”250 Mohawk asserted that “[t]he 
instant case [Mohawk Industries] has identical defects [to Anza] which are patently apparent.”251 
This creates a complicated problem for the Supreme Court.  On the one hand, it is fairly 
clear that the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in Mohawk Industries contradicts the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Anza. The Supreme Court had previously vacated a similar Eleventh Circuit decision 
in Mohawk Industries before Anza, and remanded the case in light of its Anza decision.  The 
Eleventh Circuit’s second decision was similar to its first, ignoring much of Anza outside its 
particular facts.  On the other hand, if the Supreme Court grants certiorari to Mohawk Industries 
again, it will be forced to answer an immensely difficult decision that has the potential to run 
against the legislative intent of civil RICO.  As it stands, the plaintiffs in Mohawk have applied 
for class action status, which would put potentially hundreds of millions of dollars in damages, 
attorney’s fees and costs, and bad publicity at stake.  Like Trollinger v. Tyson, Wal-Mart, and 
Commercial Cleaners, Mohawk Industries will likely settle this lawsuit with a lucrative payout if 
the Supreme Court does not take the case.  
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
RICO has been a controversial statute since its enactment more than thirty years ago.  
Congress created the remedial statute to address the undesirable organized crime and mafia 
presence in the United States and the inability for law enforcement to effectively resolve the 
problem.  Regardless of its initial purpose, RICO has developed, with the support of Congress, 
into a broadly interpreted statute that holds those liable of clearly defined predicate offenses 
liable to competitors, business partners, and most recently, employees for injuries sustained by 
these criminal acts.  This development has created widespread criticism of civil RICO’s 
application to vulnerable deep pocket corporations where the damages easily swell into the tens 
of millions of dollars.  Civil RICO defendants consistently argue that the scope of liability under 
RICO extends only to those involved in organized crime, as originally intended under the statute.  
Nevertheless, congressional expansion of several predicate offenses through the late twentieth 
century has shown legislative approval of broad application of civil RICO to private plaintiffs 
that are injured by the defined criminal acts of the defendants that often go undetected by or 
surpass the resources of governmental law enforcement agencies. 
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Although the civil application of RICO can potentially open a litigation floodgate 
because of its treble damages remedy as well as attorney’s fees and costs, this risk is 
unsubstantiated. The statute includes a ‘by reason of” requirement, when applied as Congress 
intended and in Mohawk Industries, that filters out inappropriate civil RICO suits with plaintiffs 
outside the intended directness under the statute.  The U.S. Supreme Court’s “direct proximate 
cause” requirement in Anza, however, goes far beyond Congress’s intended limitations under its 
liberal construction clause and RICO’s statutory development over the past twenty years.  If 
followed broadly, Anza’s decision would most likely eliminate virtually every civil RICO 
lawsuit brought by a party other than the enforcement agency in charge of criminally prosecuting 
the applicable predicate offense.  This interpretation would frustrate the legislative intent to 
allow private parties to act as “private attorneys general” to assist law enforcement in eradicating 
illegal conspiracies that provide an unfair advantage over the injured party. 
 
Civil RICO does not apply to the most directly affected party of the unlawful conspiracy.  
Rather, civil RICO is intended to allow private parties to hold competitors, debtors, and 
employers, among others, liable for unlawfully benefiting or profiting from a criminal act that 
gave it an illicit competitive advantage.  These private parties still are required to be directly and
proximately injured by the racketeering offense of the alleged conspiracy, but not the most 
directly injured party. 
 
To prevent limitless conflicting court decisions that usually take upwards to six years to 
litigate, Congress should amend RICO to address the manner in which the statute has developed 
in modern times.  The amendment should address two key points most controversial during 
litigation.  First, it should clearly define who has statutory standing to bring a civil RICO claim.  
The primary issue being whether it is the one most directly injured (Anza and Holmes direct 
proximate cause) or a lesser requirement where the plaintiff only must show it was directly 
injured (by reason of) from the unlawful activity.  Second, although beyond the analytical scope 
of this article, Congress should clearly define who could be sued under RICO to further limit 
lawsuits that are beyond its scope.  These amendments will simplify the civil RICO statutory 
standing and direct proximate cause requirements, thereby permitting claims that assist in the 
private enforcement of unlawful acts that are beyond the scope of law enforcement resources and 
conversely eliminate claims that are beyond the statutory scope of the statute. 
